Issues in Experimental Philosophy: Sources of philosophical intuitions (2021/2022)

The seminar examines recent theoretical and empirical research into psychological explanations of the sources of philosophical intuitions.

Convenors: Bartosz Maćkiewicz, Katarzyna Kuś

Course code: 3800-PFE21-S. Language of instruction: Polish. Course description in USOS.

Philosophers frequently use thought experiments: hypothetical situations subjected to intuitive assessment, usually by the person who devised them. The resulting philosophical intuitions serve as arguments for or against philosophical positions.

The seminar addresses three questions about this method: (1) does this account accurately describe philosophical practice? (2) are philosophers in a privileged epistemic position that enables them to assess cases reliably? (3) how do the philosophical intuitions underlying these assessments arise?

We approach these questions within experimental philosophy. This is a research seminar; assessment includes preparing and conducting a team study in experimental philosophy.

Classes are organised into thematic blocks. The main activity is the joint discussion and analysis of recent work in experimental philosophy and metaphilosophy.

Detailed programme: first semester

BLOCK 1. The sources project at the origins of experimental philosophy

The first block introduces the basic commitments of experimental philosophy and traces the origins of its sources project.

We begin with Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols's manifesto, which outlines possible directions and questions for experimental philosophy. It anticipates the sources project: the systematic investigation of the psychological mechanisms generating intuitions used in philosophical argument. We discuss the potential metaphilosophical implications of identifying these sources.

BLOCK 2. The method of cases and philosophical intuitions: myth or actual practice?

Some experimental philosophers assume that philosophical debates rely on the method of cases, understood as constructing thought experiments and assessing them intuitively. Assessing this claim requires clarifying what the method of cases involves and what the intuitions used to evaluate cases are. This block introduces the main positions on both questions.

We read two texts. James Andow surveys the debate about intuitions that accompanied the development of experimental philosophy. A chapter by Edouard Machery analyses the use of the method of cases and challenges the familiar view that it rests on intuitive assessments of thought experiments.

BLOCK 3. Can we rely on intuitions? Philosophically irrelevant influences

Experimental philosophy investigates the sensitivity of intuitions to presentation order, framing and apparently irrelevant wording differences. Such findings have been used to challenge the method of cases. Its defenders suggest that these effects may reflect insufficient training or reflection. We read Machery's discussion of these influences and Eric Schwitzgebel and Fiery Cushman's study showing that such effects also occur among trained philosophers.

BLOCK 4. Sources of moral intuitions

Thought experiments are widely used in moral philosophy, especially in the analytic tradition. Examining intuitions about ethically controversial cases may help identify general ethical principles. Yet intuitions are not always clear or consistent: considering moral choices can produce a sense of internal conflict. The boundary between cases that elicit clear intuitions and those that produce conflict may be unexpected.

We examine the debate over dual-process explanations of conflicting moral intuitions and the development of this approach. We also ask whether a psychological explanation of conflicting intuitions can help resolve the philosophical dispute between them.

BLOCK 5. Sources of epistemological intuitions

This block examines psychological mechanisms underlying intuitions about knowledge and perception. We first consider empirical findings relevant to the arguments from illusion and hallucination. Two papers by Eugen Fischer and Paul Engelhardt examine how unwarranted inferences based on stereotypes associated with perception verbs can lead to phenomenalist conclusions. A paper by Shaun Nichols and Ángel Pinillos then explores how statistical learning theory can explain the intuitive appeal of epistemic infallibilism and sceptical arguments.

BLOCK 6. Dualism and determinism

The final block examines the explanatory-gap argument in debates about the mind-body problem. Brian Fiala, Adam Arico and Shaun Nichols propose a testable hypothesis explaining dualist intuitions through two independent cognitive mechanisms for attributing consciousness. We discuss their findings and explanation, and ask how far these results can contribute to resolving the philosophical mind-body problem.