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Issues in Experimental Philosophy: Folk Action Theory (2020/2021)

The seminar examines folk theories of action as a subject of experimental philosophy.

Convenors: Katarzyna Kuś, Adrian Ziółkowski

Course code: 3501-PFE20-S. Language of instruction: Polish. Course description in USOS.

The first semester introduces experimental philosophy and its main findings about folk theories of action, including the Knobe effect, Butler's problem and factors affecting attributions of agency and responsibility. In the second semester, participants design and conduct their own research projects.

This is a research seminar. Assessment includes preparing and conducting a team study in experimental philosophy.

BLOCK I: Introduction to experimental philosophy of action

  • Knobe, J.,Nichols, S. (2008), “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto.” In Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. (ed.), Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 3–14.–
  • Malle, B., Knobe, J. (1997), “The Folk Concept of Intentional Action.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 101–121.

BLOCK II: The side-effect effect and its explanations

  • Knobe, J. (2003a), “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language,” Analysis, 63, 190–3.
  • Knobe, J. (2003b), “Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation,” Philosophical Psychology, 16(2), 309–323.
  • Wyjaśnienie: efekt Knobe’a wynikiem rozumowań pragmatycznych
  • Adams, F., Steadman, A. (2004a), “Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding,” Analysis 74, 173–181. & Adams, F., Steadman, A. (2004a), “Intentional Actions and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic,” Analysis 74, 268–272.
  • McCann, H. (2005), “Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies,” Philosophical Psychology, 18, 737–748.

Explanation: intentionality as a normative concept

  • Knobe, J. (2006), “The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology,” Philosophical Studies. 130: 203–231.
  • Machery, E. (2008), “The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues,” Mind & Language, 23, 165–189.

Explanation: the Knobe effect as a result of emotional bias

  • Greene, J., Haidt, J. (2002), “How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?” Trends in Cognitive Science, 6: 517–523. & Nadelhoffer, T. (2004), “Praise, Side Effects, and Intentional Action,” The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24, 196–213.
  • Young, L., Cushman, F., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., and Hauser, M. (2006), “Does Emotion Mediate the Relationship between an Action’s Moral Status and its Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence,” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1–2), 291–304.

Explanation: the Knobe effect as a result of differences in scenario interpretation

  • Nichols, S. and Ulatowski, J. (2007), “Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited,” Mind & Language, 22(4), 346–365.
  • Feltz, A. and Cokely, E. (2007), “An Anomaly in Intentional Action Ascription: More Evidence of Folk Diversity.” Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society.

BLOCK III: Ordinary concepts of causation, agency and omission

  • Hitchcock, C., & Knobe, J. (2009). Cause and norm. The Journal of Philosophy, 106(11), 587-612.
  • Alicke, M. D., Rose, D., Bloom, D. (2011). Causation, norm violation, and culpable control. The Journal of Philosophy, 108(12), 670-696.
  • Clarke, R., Shepherd, J., Stigall, J., Waller, R. R., Zarpentine, C. (2015). Causation, norms, and omissions: A study of causal judgments. Philosophical Psychology, 28(2), 279-293.
  • Henne, P., Pinillos, Á., De Brigard, F. (2017). Cause by omission and norm: Not watering plants. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(2), 270-283.

BLOCK IV: Group action: attributing intentions and responsibility

  • Gerstenberg, T., and Lagnado, D. A. (2010). Spreading the blame: The allocation of responsibility amongst multiple agents. Cognition, 115(1), 166-171.
  • Lagnado, D. A., Gerstenberg T., Zultan R. (2013), Causal responsibility and counterfactuals. Cognitive science 37.6 (2013): 1036-1073.
  • Michael J. A., Szigeti A. (2019) “The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups, Philosophical Explorations, 22:1, 44-61.

BLOCK V: Free will and responsibility

  • Nahmias, E. Morris, S. Nadelhoffer, T., Turner, J. (2005), “Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Psychology 18: 561–84.
  • Nahmias, E. Morris, S. Nadelhoffer, T., Turner, J. (2006), “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 28–53.
  • Nichols, S. and Knobe, J. (2007), “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions,” Nous 41: 663–85.
  • Sarkissian, Hagop ; Chatterjee, Amita ; de Brigard, Felipe ; Knobe, Joshua; Nichols, Shaun & Sirker, Smita (2010). Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal? Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.
  • Rose, David & Nichols, Shaun (2013). The Lesson of Bypassing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.
  • Nadelhoffer, Thomas ; Shepard, Jason ; Nahmias, Eddy ; Sripada, Chandra & Ross, Lisa Thomson (2014). The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility. Consciousness and Cognition 25:27-41.
  • Murray, Dylan & Nahmias, Eddy (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.

Second semester

During the summer semester, students work in teams of two to four to design and prepare an empirical study in experimental philosophy of action. They then conduct the study, analyse and interpret the results, and prepare a research report.