Archive

Issues in experimental philosophy: experimental philosophy of mind (2023/2024)

The seminar examines issues studied in experimental philosophy of mind.

Convenors: Katarzyna Kuś, Adrian Ziółkowski

Course code: 3800-PFE23-S. Language of instruction: Polish. Course description in USOS.

The first semester and part of the second introduce experimental philosophy and examine research on phenomenal consciousness, the explanatory gap, pain, perception and emotion. The latter part of the second semester is devoted to designing and conducting team research projects.

BLOCK I: Phenomenal consciousness

  1. Knobe, J., Prinz, J. (2008). Intuitions about consciousness. Experimental studies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7, 67-83.
  2. Sytsma, J. M.,  Machery, E. (2009). How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 22(1), 21-35.
  3. Sytsma, J.,  Machery, E. (2010). Two conceptions of subjective experience. Philosophical Studies, 151, 299-327.
  4. Phelan, M., Arico, A.,  Nichols, S. (2013). Thinking things and feeling things. On an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12, 703-725.
  5. Strickland, Brent  Suben, Aysu (2012). Experimenter Philosophy. The Problem of Experimenter Bias in Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3(3). 457-467.
  6. Sytsma, J.,  Ozdemir, E. (2019). No problem. Evidence that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is not widespread. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(9-10), 241-256.

BLOCK II: The explanatory gap

  1. Brian Fiala, Adam Arico i Shaun Nichols (2012). On the psychological origins of dualism. Dual-process cognition and the explanatory gap. W: Creating consilience. Integrating science and the humanities (2012), s. 88-110.
  2. Eugen Fischer i Justin Sytsma (2021). Zombie intuitions, Cognition 215, 1-12.

BLOCK III: The ordinary concept of pain

  1. Reuter, K. (2011). Distinguishing the appearance from the reality of pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(9-10), 94-109.
  2. Reuter, K.,  Sytsma, J. (2020). Unfelt pain. Synthese, 197(4), 1777-1801.
  3. Kim, H. E., Poth, N., Reuter, K.,  Sytsma, J. (2016). Where is your pain? A cross-cultural comparison of the concept of pain in Americans and South Koreans. Studia Philosophica Estonia, 9(1), 136-169.

BLOCK IV: Folk theories of perception and colour perception

  1. Cohen, J., and Nichols, S. (2010). Colours, colour relationalism and the deliverances of introspection. Analysis, 70(2), 218–228.
  2. Roberts, P., Andow, J.,  Schmidtke, K. (2014). Colour relationalism and the real deliverances of introspection. Erkenntnis, 79(5), 1173–89.
  3. Allen, K., Quinlan, P., Andow, J.,  Fischer, E. (2022). What is it like to be colour‐blind. A case study in experimental philosophy of experience. Mind  Language, 37(5), 814-839.
  4. Fischer, E., Allen, K.  Engelhardt, P.E. (2023) Fragmented and conflicted. Folk beliefs about vision. Synthese 201, 84.

BLOCK V: Folk theories of memory and emotion

  1. Díaz, R.,  Reuter, K. (2021). Feeling the right way. Normative influences on peoples use of emotion concepts. Mind  Language, 36(3), 451-470.
  2. Díaz, R. (2022). Emotions and the body. Testing the subtraction argument. Philosophical Psychology 35 (1), 47-65.
  3. Dranseika, V. (2020). False memories and quasi-memories. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3, 3, 175-188.
  4. Dranseika, V., McCarroll, C. J.,  Michaelian, K. (2021). Are observer memories (accurate) memories. Insights from experimental philosophy. Consciousness and Cognition, 96, 103240.