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KogniLab (pok. 43)

24 kwietnia 2025

Eksperymentalna filozofia umysłu (2023-2024)

Seminarium poświęcone jest zagadnieniom badanym w ramach eksperymentalnej filozofii umysłu.

Prowadzący: Katarzyna Kuś, Adrian Ziółkowski

BLOK I: Świadomość fenomenalna

  1. Knobe, J., Prinz, J. (2008). Intuitions about consciousness. Experimental studies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7, 67-83.
  2. Sytsma, J. M.,  Machery, E. (2009). How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 22(1), 21-35.
  3. Sytsma, J.,  Machery, E. (2010). Two conceptions of subjective experience. Philosophical Studies, 151, 299-327.
  4. Phelan, M., Arico, A.,  Nichols, S. (2013). Thinking things and feeling things. On an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12, 703-725.
  5. Strickland, Brent  Suben, Aysu (2012). Experimenter Philosophy. The Problem of Experimenter Bias in Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3(3). 457-467.
  6. Sytsma, J.,  Ozdemir, E. (2019). No problem. Evidence that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is not widespread. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(9-10), 241-256.


BLOK II: Problem luki eksplanacyjnej

  1. Brian Fiala, Adam Arico i Shaun Nichols (2012). On the psychological origins of dualism. Dual-process cognition and the explanatory gap. W: Creating consilience. Integrating science and the humanities (2012), s. 88-110.
  2. Eugen Fischer i Justin Sytsma (2021). Zombie intuitions, Cognition 215, 1-12.


BLOK III: Potoczne pojęcie bólu

  1. Reuter, K. (2011). Distinguishing the appearance from the reality of pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(9-10), 94-109.
  2. Reuter, K.,  Sytsma, J. (2020). Unfelt pain. Synthese, 197(4), 1777-1801.
  3. Kim, H. E., Poth, N., Reuter, K.,  Sytsma, J. (2016). Where is your pain? A cross-cultural comparison of the concept of pain in Americans and South Koreans. Studia Philosophica Estonia, 9(1), 136-169.


BLOK IV: Potoczne teoria percepcji i postrzegania kolorów

  1. Cohen, J., and Nichols, S. (2010). Colours, colour relationalism and the deliverances of introspection. Analysis, 70(2), 218–228.
  2. Roberts, P., Andow, J.,  Schmidtke, K. (2014). Colour relationalism and the real deliverances of introspection. Erkenntnis, 79(5), 1173–89.
  3. Allen, K., Quinlan, P., Andow, J.,  Fischer, E. (2022). What is it like to be colour‐blind. A case study in experimental philosophy of experience. Mind  Language, 37(5), 814-839.
  4. Fischer, E., Allen, K.  Engelhardt, P.E. (2023) Fragmented and conflicted. Folk beliefs about vision. Synthese 201, 84.


BLOK V: Potoczne teorie pamięci i emocji

  1. Díaz, R.,  Reuter, K. (2021). Feeling the right way. Normative influences on peoples use of emotion concepts. Mind  Language, 36(3), 451-470.
  2. Díaz, R. (2022). Emotions and the body. Testing the subtraction argument. Philosophical Psychology 35 (1), 47-65.
  3. Dranseika, V. (2020). False memories and quasi-memories. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3, 3, 175-188.
  4. Dranseika, V., McCarroll, C. J.,  Michaelian, K. (2021). Are observer memories (accurate) memories. Insights from experimental philosophy. Consciousness and Cognition, 96, 103240.